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Abstract: Has the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) used formal 
arguments to evade the judgment of conflicts submitted by the concentrated 
judicial review? Over the past 20 years, the Supreme Court has denied trial to a 
growing number of cases, citing the presence of formal defects, mainly due to 
the so-called incidental “lack of grounds": when, owing to the delay in 
assessing the conflict, alluded legal standard ceases to exist or have effect. This 
research starts from the Bickel’s hypothesis (1962): courts deliberately use 
passive virtues – self-restriction techniques, usually of procedural nature, 
which provide the court with the option to avoid the assessment of a case – in 
order to seek to understand the "lack of grounds" institutional phenomenon. In 
this sense, data from the Brazilian Supreme Court’s on the cases on which the 
"lack of grounds" was harvested were subjected of statistical inferences, in 
order to explain, through modeling, this omission behavior of the Court. 
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"The jurisprudence of this Supreme Court has no divergence on supervening 
lack of ground as prejudicial to the continuity of the ADI when befalls repeal 
or substantial amendment of the law in question on its constitutionality". Min. 
Luiz Fux, ADI 4061. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Brazil, in the judicial review system it is allowed to obtain statements 
directly from the Highest Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF) through specific 
legal instruments, which use is restricted by the Constitution to a group of few 
relevant political actors, such as the President, political parties and the Attorney 
General (TAYLOR, 2008). 
The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 provides a number of tools to 
start a concentrated constitutional review, among which one with greater use and 
relevance in the legal and political scenarios is the ação direta de 
inconstitucionalidade (ADI), proposed more than five thousand times throughout 
more than twenty years of the Federal Constitution existence, covering highly 
relevant issues under federal and state law (TAYLOR, 2008; VIANNA et al., 1999). 
To understand the political consequences of the judicial behavior and the 
judicial review, as well as the variations of these consequences as well as the 
institutional arrangements, and the historical-political contexts involved, is presented 
as a profitable research agenda of social scientists of our time. 
In this sense, judicial review is identified by most studies in Law and 
Political Science as a contingent activity of the political game (TAYLOR; DA ROS, 
2008), e.g., as a potential alternative strategy to interests defeated in the legislative 
sphere, in order to obtain the judicial application of constitutional limits on 
legislative activity. 
However, original data collected from the Brazilian Supreme Court’s 
decisions in ADI cases point in the opposite direction: the self-restraint. The Court 
has demonstrated, over the past twenty years, a cooperative trend with the interests 
of the Executive branch, when triggered by constitutional review mechanisms 
(judicial review), whether confirming the constitutionality of legislation, or 
informally, simply by letting a large number of conflicts without judgment. 
Take for example the following situation: on the date of October 30, 2013, 
was issued Federal Law # 12,875, whose content changed a previous Federal Law # 
9.504 (laying down general rules on elections), setting new criteria for the 
distribution among the various political parties and coalitions, the schedule for the 
dissemination of free electoral propaganda by radio and television. 
Dissatisfied with the criteria and feeling harmed by the alleged loss of time 
space in the free electoral propaganda and therefore, its importance in possible 
future electoral coalitions, the Partido Republicano Progressista - PRP pleaded on 
September 4, 2014, the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade (ADI) # 5159, alleging 
the unconstitutionality of these standards on the proportional division of the party's 
time on radio and television. 
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The political party sustained that the new law (#12,875) is an arbitrary and 
unconstitutional manner of the major parties to further minimize the time on radio 
and television of minority parties. For these reasons, the mentioned party argued that 
such rules would be incompatible with Articles 1, 5, 14 and 17 of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988 and asked the Supreme Court its declaration of 
unconstitutionality and the immediate suspension of its effects, so that it could 
benefit from the free party propaganda as the criteria set out in the repealed 
legislation. 
This process was in the Court until the date of 1 October 2015, when it was 
finally dismissed in unusual ways: the Court, unanimously, held that the assessment 
to the alleged unconstitutionality of the challenged electoral rules would be 
undermined by supervening lack of grounds, that is: to the Justices of the Supreme 
Court, it would not make sense, in that moment, to discuss the constitutionality of 
the Federal Law # 12,875, which had established the division of party propaganda 
time, as this was subsequently been revoked by the Law Federal # 13,165 of 
September 29, 2015, which had been published just few days before the trial. 
This amazing relationship between the time of judgment and the 
impossibility of assessing the constitutional question by the Court - before the repeal 
of the law questioned by later rules - would be fortuity or the result of a 
sophisticated self-restraint strategy adopted in response to the actors involved in the 
conflict theme, and / or the possible and undesirable practical consequences of any 
favorable judgment? 
Such behavior is close to what Bickel (1962) observed in the US Supreme 
Court's behavior and called "passive virtues": an institutional technique that would 
allow the judge in the exercise of its discretion to act strategically in order to delay 
the analysis of problematic issues to the time when the Court was ready to deal with 
them, with no commitment to the principles, nor to the democratic system. 
The institutional instrument mentioned allows members of any Court, 
before the undesirable duty to judge politically relevant conflicts, e.g., all matters of 
constitutional judicial review, to use procedural and formal arguments to avoid the 
trial and leave the conduct of policy to the other institutional bodies established by 
the will of the majority (LIMA, 2014). 
This research starts from Bickel’s hypothesis (1962): Courts can use 
deliberately passive virtues – self-restraint techniques, usually of a procedural nature 
– to avoid a case. Moreover, it will seek to understand the institutional phenomenon 
of "lack of grounds" repeatedly verified in the trial of ações diretas de 
inconstitucionalidade by the Brazilian Supreme Court. 
In this sense, data on the cases in which the "lack of ground" were collected 
in the STF website were subjected to statistical inferences, in order to explain, 
through modeling, this omission behavior of the Court, from categorical variables 
possibly correlated with a strategic behavior of the Brazilian Constitutional Court. 
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1 JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS AND OMISSION BEHAVIOR IN 
JUDICIAL REVIEW: ALEXANDER BICKEL’S PASSIVE VIRTUES 
Judicialization corresponds to the process in which the rules, procedures 
and legal discourse permeate almost every aspect of modern life, whose social 
institutions eventually adopt "quasi-judicial" mechanisms (GALANTER, 1993). On 
the other hand, the judicialization of politics is a more specific operational concept: 
which refers to the new dynamics between the legal agencies and the political 
environment, deals with these interactions in their institutional aspects and analyzes 
their impact on the behavior of political and legal actors (KOERNER; MACIEL, 
2002) subsequent choices. The Courts have to define their roles, as they must make 
choices, fighting their "battles" carefully limited to those conflicts that can win or 
act more aggressively and cause counterattacks (GINSBURG, 2003). 
The phenomenon manifests itself in a substantive dimension regularly, 
corresponding to the courts' responses, studied from the perspective of "judicial 
activism”, thus, the confirmation of a propensity for activism would confirm the 
completeness – or not – of the judicialization of politics (CARVALHO, 2005).  
But what is judicial activism? This is a shared discussion among political 
scientists and jurists, with specific characteristics and different readings of each 
approach (GREEN, 2009). 
Among the Political Scientists, initially, regarding the collected data, 
departing from quantitative perspective onto other discussions, with the analysis of 
the causes and repercussions of a judicial behavior agenda that seeks to investigate 
the causes and consequences, as well as whether there is or not a tendency of 
judicial activism. Initially, the quantitative analysis of counter-majoritarian decisions 
was dominant in the literature, concerned with the frequency with which a particular 
judge or court invalidated the rules and other acts of other state bodies (HOWARD; 
SEGAL, 2004), especially the Federal Legislature. While this is a valid conception 
of judicial review, it is necessary to go further and investigate other positions of 
judges that do not fit in activism settings, seeking to know the peculiarities of self-
restraint and its respective behaviors. 
Recently, there had been an effort in the evaluation of more substantive 
aspects of the debate, beyond the statistics. Dealing with the extension of the subject 
matter and its approach to the legal debate, Frank B. Cross and Stefanie Lindquist 
(2009) set standards for activism approach or the definition of a "shyness" behavior, 
taking into account two reference points: the institutional one and ideological one.  
Institutionally, the evaluation can be made from the constitutionality of 
parameters: (a) the judicial review of federal statutes; (B) judicial review of state 
regulations: (c) the judicial review of the actions of the federal government, 
including independent agencies; (D) the use of doctrines of "justiciability" (the 
access warranty, so the federal courts); (E) of the Supreme Court's propensity to 
"knock down" its earlier precedents. Whereas, the "ideological dimension" implies 
the study of standards for the invalidation of the rules, precedents or administrative 
actions of political "opponents", taking here as a criterion, the inevitable (in the US) 
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distinction between "liberal" or "conservative " judges (CROSS; LINDQUIST, 
2009). 
Back to these criteria, the characterization of a judicial activism depends on 
the identification of a tendency of the courts to interfere with other branches - 
invalidating decisions or establishing criteria for its activities - away from the 
canons regularly applied to judicial action - rules, precedents and doctrine. 
In contrast, self-restraint can be characterized by a limitation to judicial 
powers. It is possible to outline an initial self-restraint design, represented, in 
accordance with Richard Posner (2012), in three main meanings: (I) the notion that 
judges are law enforcers, but not producers (legalist-formalist perspective); (II) the 
need for deference to other political actors (modesty, institutional competence and 
others); and (III) the prospect of highly reluctant judges to declare unconstitutional 
acts of the legislative and executive branches. 
Although, the dimensions of self-restraint would present contradictions 
among themselves, they are facets of an attempt to understand the limits to judicial 
action. Technically, there would be a contradiction between the first and third 
dimensions, considering the possibility that the normative understanding prevents or 
hinders the characterization of a judicial self-restraint (POSNER, 2012). This self-
restraint parameter would require that the judge wouldn´t have a clear theory of 
constitutional interpretation. As, given a certain construction, it would be an obstacle 
for keeping the norm, even if its unconstitutionality could be seen (POSNER, 1983, 
p. 20).  
The design of self-restraint demands a particular vision of the judiciary 
body and its role in a democracy, changeable in accordance with the varying legal 
concepts. However, it covers the need for the inclusion of the Courts in a political 
environment – struggling with the need for acceptance of their decisions – and 
difficulties – including technical ones– that they face in the exercise of their activity. 
In this sense, consider the remarkable contribution of Alexander Bickel, in 
his book published in 1962, "The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics." The author, trying to understand the role of the US Supreme 
Court and other lower courts in the United States, argued that their actions would be 
justified by the protection of the fundamental principles of society. He recognized, 
however, that the success of the judicial review depended, ultimately, on the popular 
acceptance of these judicial decisions. 
According to Bickel (1962, p.16-18), judicial review is a "counter-
majoritarian force in our system" and thus " a deviant institution in the American 
democracy." When the court invalidates the acts of the powers subject to electoral 
processes, this control is exercised not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
against it, "it thwarts the will of the Representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now", which gives veto power to a small minority, over the majority. According 
to this author, "[...] without mystic overtones, this is actually what happens ". 
Revista Direito e Justiça: Reflexões Sociojurídicas, Santo Ângelo, v. 18, n. 30, jan./abr. 2018. 
26 
In fact, counter-majoritarian premise is the starting point for a thought-
provoking discussion of the distinctive notes of the Supreme Court activity and other 
courts as performed by the Legislative and Executive branches (BICKEL, 1962).  
While the majority branches are subject to pressures from various groups 
and interests in order to produce immediate results in convenience judgments, facing 
the pressing material needs, only the courts – especially the Supreme Court – are 
equipped with the essential features to articulate ,continuously and consistently, 
permanent values. The special responsibility of these bodies is to act as 
spokespersons ("pronouncers") and guardians of stable values ("enduring values") of 
society. 
Its members, apart from conflicts of interest, have the training and the 
isolation needed for "the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways 
of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government." And the court activity should be 
based solely on these enduring principles, these social ideals, in order to enjoy the 
action of the constitutionality of other powers. 
It was what Bickel called a "lincolnian tension" (BICKEL, 1961, p. 49) 
between principle and consent, in which sits the democratic system of government, 
and, in which the institution of judicial review must play its role and try to achieve 
some measure of agreement, a compromise between these two fundamental 
elements. 
The conflict between the principle notions of consent and the court presents 
to the Court a complex problem; since to exercise their activity, need to reduce the 
voltage to a tolerable level. The court should not ignore the basic principles, but 
rather be attentive to the reality in which it operates. 
 In this complicated equation, according to Bickel, the constitutional 
doctrine and the court itself forget the triple power that the latter has, considering 
that its possibilities spectrum is not limited only to maintenance options or 
cancellation of a rule before its incompatibility with the principles. The Court has 
also the option of doing nothing, which makes it feasible to maintain the "tension 
between principle and opportunity" without the commitment of that (BICKEL, 1962, 
p. 69). 
Passive virtues are legal arguments – often of procedural nature - which 
give the court the possibility of avoiding the assessment of a case that had been 
referred to it. Thus, it can assert its jurisdiction to decide, the absence of active 
applicant's legitimacy, "lack of maturity" of the case, resort to the doctrine of 
"political issues", among other typical arguments of the US judicial system, although 
akin to the procedural constructs of other systems. 
Although extensively arguing on these passive virtues, pointing out the 
differences between these techniques, Bickel has no standards or principles to assist 
the court in choosing whether to use it or not, neither in choosing the "tool" to be 
used. This issue does not involve academic wisdom, but skills in the art of 
"commitment" and "familiarity with the forms," or, as the author himself prefers, the 
exercise of the art of prudence, distinct from the principle of judgment (BICKEL, 
1962 p. 26). 
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For him, these techniques are tools available to judges, leaving the electoral 
institutions to conduct the policy, as they withdraw from it. By using this expedient, 
the court would act as a "political animal" (BICKEL, 1961, p. 51). 
The option for the use of passive virtues can also mirror awareness of its 
limitations. In addressing the doctrine of political questions, Bickel recalls that this 
construction is supported in the sense of "lack of capacity", consisting of several 
factors which, together, represent the internal vulnerability of an institution, in a 
"mature democracy" is electorally irresponsible and has no power to enforce its 
decisions (BICKEL, 1962, p.184). 
The initial advantage of the use of these techniques seems settled: 
preventing the cutting position is definitely in detriment of its role as guardian of the 
principles, or confronts public opinion and the majority powers. By leaving the 
question open, it remains faithful to its commitments. 
Passive virtues still allow the court to explore the "wonderful mystery of 
time" (BICKEL, 1962, p.26), in its various implications. Sometimes in the 
subsequent opportunity of the trial, it can be concluded that it is time to directly 
address the issue, even if based on a principle contrary to popular expectation. To 
mitigate the impact of the decision contrary to the majority, Bickel suggests using 
"rhetorical instruments" (BICKEL, 1962, p.188). 
In other cases, the court postpones the answer because it has doubts as to 
the controlling principle or about its meaning. Although the principles are enduring, 
the author believes that their design projects large shadows for the future. To solve 
their uncertainty, it employs temporary solutions allowing it to evaluate the public 
and government officials' reactions, in order to build their understanding. So, instead 
of simply postponing the debate, the court plays an educational role by using these 
interim decisions as a strategy of slow persuasion, to come up with ideas that it has 
already articulated in its final form. 
His argument is that the period after the decision is used to build a dialogue 
or, as the author prefers a "conversation" between the branches of government on 
the principle issues involved. Thus, choosing not to decide, it is possible that the 
"lincolnian tension" is attenuated or even resolved by these dialogues, and the court 
reaches a better understanding of the issues involved for their proper resolution 
(BICKEL, 1962, p. 206- 261). When a Court finally decides to judge, there may be a 
widespread acceptance of the result, because the debate would have matured in 
public opinion. 
2 COINCIDENCE OR STRATEGY: SUPERVENING “LACK OF GROUNDS” 
IN ABSTRACT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
What would be the alleged supervening lack of grounds and how this formal 
condition would affect the continuation of the ações diretas de 
inconstitucionalidade? Understanding this phenomenon demands facing a formal 
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question (technical and procedural) under the Brazilian civil procedural law related 
to the validity of the opening and the continuity of a process: the procedural interest. 
The procedural interest refers to the need and usefulness of the trial of a 
case by an individual or collegiate Judicial body (CUNHA, 2002; BEDAQUE, 
2016): the filing of a legal action means provoking (call) the judiciary to interfere in 
a conflict of interest, characterized by the alleged breach by the other party of a 
standard, either legal or contractual. 
Should the courts, thereby, verify the presence of a conflict to be resolved 
as a condition for a valid opening or continuity of a process? Accordingly, the prior 
absence of a dispute to be solved or the subsequent closure (for whatever reason) of 
an existing dispute characterize a serious formal defect that would lead 
immediately to extinction (closure) of the process and undermine the judgment of 
the contentious issue, avoiding unjustifiable or processes that do not have social 
utility (BEDAQUE, 2016). 
Exemplifying the first situation (filing the lawsuit despite the absence of 
conflict to be solved by the judiciary) would lead to some hypothetical situations: a) 
the judicial plea of tax refund of unduly paid taxes when the same sum have been 
the subject of administrative application prior compensation to the tax authorities; b) 
the civil servant that carelessly requires judicially the implementation of a bonus 
already incorporated into his salaries; c) the filing of a writ of mandamus against 
administrative act supposedly void but without no effect to the plaintiff; d) the 
judicial request for the grant of retirement when such benefit has never been denied 
by the social security agency. 
On the other hand, for the second situation (subsequent closure of a 
previously existing dispute) there are other hypotheses: a) the subsequent retirement 
of a public servant or employee who wanted the court manifestation of their working 
conditions; b) the final conviction of an accused occurred before the trial process in 
which probation was being discussed; c) discussion of the formal validity of an 
annual budget law after the execution of all planned expenditure for that year; d) 
processes that would regard irregular building in environmental preservation area 
when subsequent legislation changes the allocation of the area. e) verification of 
legal age achieved during the process, in which child support rights were being 
discussed. 
It is this second situation that sets up the damage alleged in the trial by 
supervening lack of grounds: the Judiciary would be unable to judge the matter 
before it, due to the verification of events that occurred during the process whose 
consequences in theory, would close the dispute. So, the procedural interest 
disappears when it could no longer derive any utility from the judgment of the 
process (THEODORO JUNIOR, 2016). 
The argument of lack of grounds is used to terminate the process or appeal, 
whenever any further event will harm the solution of outstanding issues, 
depriving the current relevance, so that the decision would become merely 
academic or hypothetical (THEODORO JUNIOR, 2016, p.1037 - emphasis in 
original). 
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Regarding abstract judicial review, recurring decisions of the Supreme 
Court (e.g., ADIs No. 2097, 520, 2118, 763) have understood that the damage by 
supervening lack of grounds occurs (regardless whether the standard allegedly 
unconstitutional provision produces or not concrete effects) when, during the 
proceedings, that provision is revoked or subsequently amended in the Constitution 
which validates the situation before inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. 
Given as examples, in the ADI No. 2971 the Supreme Court considered the 
supervening loss of the object for further reform via constitutional amendment, the 
higher standard incompatible with the challenged legislation; yet in the ADI No. 
5160, the same Court understood that this procedural phenomenon was present by 
the withdrawal of the contested budget legislation subsequently to the 
commencement of proceedings. 
Would such simple situations be a matter of coincidence or the result of a 
strategic posture of the judges against disputes whose judgment would impose to the 
Court unnecessary political costs? 
The circumstances referred to in the introduction hereinbefore (ADI No. 
5159) give us evidence contrary to a mere fortuity occurrence and / or unforeseeable 
circumstances, able to make the process faulty and prevent its trial: the challenged 
legislation was not revoked shortly after filing the lawsuit. 
Otherwise: the process continued for months, with no decision, and a few 
days after the news of the revocation of the law, it was effectively tried, alleging 
formal vice attributed to supervening lack of grounds, a defect of form nonexistent 
in the beginning, but enough to prevent the Supreme Court from deciding on the 
unconstitutionality of the given electoral law. 
This is not an isolated situation: in the universe of 5,546 (five thousand five 
hundred and forty-six) ADIs presented over the 27 (twenty seven) years of the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution, a significant number of 743 (seven hundred and 
forty-three) processes were deemed impaired by supervening lack of grounds 
(13.4% of the total). This is a recurring behavior of Justices of the Brazilian 
Supreme Federal Court, remaining inert against the unconstitutionality questioned 
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Graph #1 – lack of grounds per year 
 
Font: Author’s original dataset from decisions available at Brazilian Supreme Court’s website 
 
The self-restraint judicial conception, among many existing definitions, can 
be understood as a substantive political principle used by judges when provoked to 
decide certain disputes, as to avoid the exercise of judicial review in circumstances 
whose characteristics encourage the removal of the judicial body from their primary 
functions (POSNER, 1983). 
Silently, the Brazilian Supreme Court Justices take a stance in situations 
where there are presumably high political judgment costs- before the other 
constituted powers, considering the expectative of other political actors, their peers, 
the public etc. – in which case, they hand it over to the "wonderful mystery of time" 
(BICKEL, 1962), assuming the risk of the actual effects of the legal standard, while 
disputes were supposedly “spontaneously” solved. 
And why would they do that? The literature provides the strategic model of 
the judicial behavior explanation, according to which external factors affect the 
judicial decisions from the judge's concern about the consequences of that particular 
case to society and the expectations of other actors in relation to the judgment (e.g., 
among others, DAHL, 1957; EPSTEIN and KNIGHT, 1998; BOILER et al., 1999; 
TAYLOR, 2008).  
For the strategic model, the judicial behavior is explained in the abstract 
anticipation of the consequences and implications (pragmatic) which can (or could) 
result from its position on a controversial constitutional question raised by a lawsuit. 
External constraints to the judicial bodies are capable of producing a 
network of institutional incentives favoring judiciary actors to behave strategically, 
e.g., considering the costs and benefits that they would have to bear, from any 
results of their decisions (MURPHY, 1964) whether judging in a certain way or 
simply not judging, alleging any technical justification. 
It is precisely at this point that Bickel’s (1962) argument on the passive 
virtues is resumed: this research starts from the assumption that the Supreme Court 
uses the deliberate waiting and the consequent supervening lack of grounds 
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argument as a technical tool of self-restraint (procedural) providing a means to the 
Court to avoid the assessment of a case. 
In these situations, rather than assuming the costs of expressly declaring 
their option for self-restraint or judging the constitutionality of the legislation, the 
judicial bodies use time as their ally, delaying the trial until it is verified the change 
in the circumstances that involve the litigation and, therefore, affecting the decision 
with supervening lack of grounds.  
3 "PASSIVE VIRTUES" IN ACTION: WHICH FACTORS INFLUENCE 
THE DECISION FOR LACK OF GROUNDS? 
The analysis of judicial behavior, especially when it comes to high-profile 
decisions and obvious political consequences – e.g., the discussion of the 
constitutionality of a rule issued by the Congress or the Executive – is a relevant 
issue in the research agenda in public law and, mainly in Political Science. 
If judges have a substantial amount of discretion in deciding cases, then it is 
important to know the motives and the value systems, which influence their exercise 
of discretion. [...] If the law is the way judges behave, judicial then behavior is a key 
to the law (PRITCHETT, C. H., 1969, p.36) 
Understanding why the judges decide in this or that way enables a deeper 
analysis of the interactive dynamic between the various institutions that constitute 
the Brazilian state, contributing to discover new dimensions of the role played by the 
law and the judges in the political arena as well as the consequences of their 
behavior for democracy. 
By opting for self-restraint, the judges present the various arguments as not 
to invalidate the tried acts, refusing expressly or tacitly, and at various levels, the 
exercise of power that was institutionally assigned, consequently reducing this 
power over the Executive and the Legislative (POSNER, 1983; LIMA, 2014). 
As mentioned above, the passive virtues (institutional and procedural 
techniques) are useful to justify the non-exercise of judicial review by an agency of 
the Judiciary, when there are circumstances that encourage self-restraint. Knowing 
which factors influence that decision, which recognizes the loss of judgment for loss 
of object - clear expression of these passive virtues- allows attempts of exploiting 
primitively (in the Brazilian institutional environment) the territory of the judicial 
self-restraint. 
In the universe of 5,546 direct actions of unconstitutionality (ADI) a 
random sample of 681 cases was collected, from which the analyzed variables were 
extracted and encoded, with a confidence level of 95% and confidence interval of 
3.52%, from the collection of information publicly available on the website of the 
Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). 
A binary dependent variable was encoded for the result of the process (1 = 
lack of grounds; 0 = no lack of grounds), as well as categorical explanatory variables 
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(dummies) were coded for legislative types, the process duration, attitudes (personal 
characteristics) of the judges and applicants for judicial review. Then, the variables 
were subjected to a binary logistic regression, or simply Logit regression: a type of 
statistical regression analysis used to predict the outcome of a binary categorical 
dependent variable, based on one or more explanatory variables.  
The statistical analysis of the data collected in this study shows that, for the 
applicants, that is, the political actors allowed to use the concentrated judicial review 
(Federal Constitution, Article 103), political parties - as illustrated by the judicial 
decision on election rules mentioned above - are those most likely to have an action 
deemed impaired by lack of grounds. 
 
Table 1 – Logit Model for plaintiff’s block 
 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
The President 
House of Deputie’s Board 







-18,958 40192,970 0,000 1 1,000 0,000 
-18,958 28420,722 0,000 1 0,999 0,000 
2,022 1,265 2,555 1 0,110 7,550 
,905 1,090 0,690 1 0,406 2,472 
1,436 1,081 1,766 1 0,184 4,205 
1,347 1,130 1,420 1 0,233 3,845 
1,997 1,081 3,413 1 0,065 7,366 
1,175 1,085 1,172 1 0,279 3,238 
-2,245 1,072 4,384 1 0,036 0,106 
U = 5546 cases; Sample = 681 
Dependent Variable: result (1 = lack of grounds, 0 = no lack of grounds) 
Font: Authors’ original dataset from decisions available at Brazilian Supreme Court’s website 
 
Adjusted the statistical model in this study the by forward stepwise method 
(conditional) - a statistical procedure available with the SPSS package and used for 
pattern adjustment in situations where there are a large number of potential 
explanatory variables, wherein each predictor is included, one by one, in the 
equation, excluding the interference of other variables and displaying only the one of 
the highest correlation with the response (ABBAD and TORRES, 2002) - the 
political party variable appears to be correlated with the expected result (1) with 
higher statistical significance. 
 
Table 2 – Logit Model adjusted by forward stepwise method 
 
 B S. E. Wald Df Sig. Exp (B) 
Political Party .821 .204 16,252 1 .000 2,272 
Constant -1.058 .097 117,961 1 .000 .347 
U = 5546 cases; Sample = 681 
Dependent Variable: result (1 = lack of grounds, 0 = no lack of grounds) 
R2 = .33 
Font: Authors’ original dataset from decisions available at Brazilian Supreme Court’s website 
 
As supported by Taylor and Da Ros (2008), political parties, especially 
those of opposition or representing minority interests, sometimes defeated in the 
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legislative arena, use the concentrated judicial review as opposition tactics in order 
to delay, prevent, disparage or simply declare (to their constituents and the general 
public) opposition to certain laws. 
While choosing this path might be successful to give visibility to the party's 
position, contrary to the contents of the law, one cannot say the same about the 
decision outcome: in the environment of the Brazilian Supreme Court, political 
parties are seven (7) times more likely to have its judicial review claims to be closed 
by supervening lack of grounds argument. 
If the political parties judicialize their demands as a strategy in the political 
dispute, this choice is not supported by the behavior of the Brazilian Supreme Court. 
The evidence collected shows that when it comes to ações diretas de 
inconstitucionalidade (ADI) filled by political parties, the Justices of the STF use a 
passive virtue – the formal damage from lack of grounds situations – as an 
institutional instrument of procedural nature to justify the non-judgment of the case, 
which enables the self-restraint.  
Before any political costs that may result from the decision (positive or 
negative) on the constitutionality of a legal standard object of the ADI, there is a 
clear choice to postpone judicial activity for the time necessary to the occurrence of 
the lack of grounds and set the aforementioned supervening formal defect – a choice 
that fits on the characteristics of the strategic explanatory model of judicial behavior 
and demonstrates, in these cases, a self-restrained posture of the Court. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although judicial review is identified as a contingent activity of the political 
game (TAYLOR, DA ROS, 2008), e.g., as a potential alternative strategy to the 
interests defeated in the legislative sphere, assuming a predominantly activist 
performance of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF), the empirical approach, 
concerning the judgment data, points to the contrary direction. 
When it specifically comes to constitutional disputes submitted by political 
parties, this reductionist conception of an activist Supreme Court does not apply, 
resulting in a sensitive court to external factors, which initially uses the time as an 
ally and postpone de decision until the Court can terminate the proceedings as a 
result of a formal argument. 
Over the past decades, the Justices of the Supreme Court, in an increasing 
number of cases, in these situations have denied the possibility of trial on the 
grounds of the presence of formal defects, especially arguing the damage to trial 
from supervening lack of grounds. This situation occurs when during the 
proceedings, that provision is revoked or occur subsequent amendment in the 
Constitution which validates the situation before inconsistent with the Federal 
Constitution. 
The use of judicial review as opposition tactics (institutional instrument 
available to the legislative minority or momentarily defeated interests), has been 
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helpful to disparage or simply to declare ( to their constituents and the general 
public) opposition to certain laws, but, as the objectives of delaying or preventing 
the effects of unwanted legislation, the chance of the case being judged impaired by 
lack of grounds is significant and concrete. 
Silently, the members of the Brazilian Supreme Court simply hand over the 
case to the "wonderful mystery of time" (BICKEL, 1962), assuming the risk of the 
actual effects of the standard, while disputes were "spontaneously" solved. 
Would such situations be a simple matter of coincidence? The empirical 
evidence collected in this research point to other direction: showing that this 
behavior would be the consequence of a strategic posture of the judges against 
disputes whose judgment would impose to the Court unnecessary political costs, 
which were submitted by political parties via concentrated judicial review. This 
choice of the Court’s members confirms Bickel’s (1962) hypothesis, according to 
which the judicial bodies, faced with undesirable situations, deliberately use passive 
virtues - self-restraint techniques, usually of a procedural nature – obviating the 
appreciation a case. 
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